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Abstract
A general collective decision problem is analysed. It consists in many issues
that are interconnected in two ways: by mutual constraints and by connections
of relevance. The goal is to decide on the issues by respecting the mutual
constraints and by aggregating in accordance with an informational constraint
given by the relevance connections. Whether this is possible in a non-degenerate
way depends on both types of connections and their interplay. One result, if
applied to the preference aggregation problem and adopting Arrows notion of
(ir)relevance, gives Arrows Theorem, without excluding indi¤erences unlike in
the existing general aggregation literature.
1 Introduction
Most complex decision problems can be formalised as consisting of many binary
decisions: decisions of accepting or rejecting certain propositions. For instance,
establishing a preference relation R over a given set of alternatives Q consists
in deciding, for each pair of alternatives x; y 2 Q, whether or not xRy. Judging
the values of di¤erent variables consists of judging, for each variable and each
of its potential values, whether or not the variable takes this value. Producing
a report that contains qualitative economic forecasts might involve deciding for
or against many propositions: atomic ones like "ination will increase" and
compound ones like "if consumption will increase and foreign demand does not
decrease, then ination will increase" (where logical operators are italicised).
Although this division into binary issues is usually possible, there are ar-
guably two distinct types of interconnections to be called logical connections
and relevance connections  that can prevent us from treating the issues in-
dependently. First, the decisions on the issues may logically constrain each
other; in the above examples, the preference judgments must respect conditions
like transitivity, the variables might constrain each other, and the propositions
stated in the economic report must be logically consistent with each other, re-
spectively. Second and this is the topic of the paper some issues may be
relevant to (the decision on) other issues. The nature and interpretation of
relevance connections is context-specic. A proposition r may be relevant to
another one p on the grounds that r is an (argumentative) premise of p, or
that r is a causal factor bringing about p, or that r and p share some other
(semantic) relation. Relevance connections are not reducible to logical connec-
tions. Two issues say, whether tra¢ c lights are necessary and whether the
diplomatic relations to a country should be interrupted may be considered
irrelevant to each other and yet be indirectly logically related via other issues
under consideration. Conversely, an issue say that of whether country x has
weapons of mass destruction may be considered relevant to another issue say
that of whether measure y against country x is appropriate without a (direct
or indirect) logical connection in the complex decision problem considered. A
more careful argument for non-reducibility is given later. Though not reducible
to logical connections, the notion of relevance is arguably related to them (as
reected by the formal denition I will give of a relevance relation).
Now suppose that the complex decision problem is faced by a group of indi-
viduals and should be settled by aggregating the individual judgments on each
proposition (issue). Many concrete aggregation models and procedures in the
literature in e¤ect account, in di¤erent ways, both for logical connections and
relevance connections. Logical connections are represented by delimiting the set
of admissible decisions, i.e., by restricting the output of the aggregation rule,
for instance in the form of collective rationality conditions like transitivity in
preference aggregation, or in the form of an overall budget constraint if di¤erent
budget items are to be decided simultaneously. By contrast, relevance connec-
tions are accounted for through the way in which the decision (output of the
aggregation rule) depends on the individualsinput: only relevant information
should be used. Arrows condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives
("IIA") is the most famous condition of exclusion of (arguably) irrelevant in-
formation. The premise-based procedure in judgment aggregation makes the
decision on certain (conclusion-type) propositions dependent on peoples judg-
ments on other (premise-type) propositions considered relevant. In general, the
question of "what is relevant for what?" may be controversial: some researchers
reject Arrows IIA condition, and in judgment aggregation it may be unclear
which propositions to consider as premises and which as conclusions, and more-
over the same conclusion-type proposition could be explained in more than one
way in terms of premises.
While accounted for in concrete aggregation problems and procedures, the
notions of relevance and of (ir)relevant information have not been treated in
general terms. In this paper, I propose to consider, in addition to logical con-
nections, a (binary) relevance relation R between propositions (issues), and to
aggregate in accordance with independence of irrelevant information ("III") and
with a certain unanimity condition. Both conditions are dened with respect
to R. To allow broad applications, I leave general the type of complex decision
problem and the interpretation and formal features of the relevance relation R:
R might be a highly partial relation (few inter-relevances) or a close to complete
relation (many inter-relevances); R need not be transitive or reexive (i.e., self-
relevance is not required); and R need not relate in a systematic way to logical
connections, except that the propositions relevant to a given proposition should
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not logically underdetermine the latter (which might be viewed as inherent to
the notion of relevance).
In the special case that every proposition is considered relevant just to itself
(i.e., pRq , p = q for any propositions p; q), III reduces to the (restrictive)
condition of proposition-wise independence (often simply called independence):
here, on each proposition an isolated vote is taken, using an arbitrary voting
rule but ignoring peoples judgments on other propositions. A number of gen-
eral results have been obtained on proposition-wise independent aggregation,
in abstract aggregation models (starting with Wilson 1975) or models of logic-
based judgment aggregation (starting with List and Pettit 2002). Essentially,
these results establish limits to the possibility of proposition-wise independent
aggregation in the presence of certain logical connections between propositions.
Impossibility results with necessary conditions on logical connections are de-
rived, for instance, by Wilson (1975), List and Pettit (2002), Pauly and van
Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006), Gärdenfors (2006), Mongin (2005) and van Hees
(forthcoming). Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2005, 2006) derive the rst results
with minimal conditions on logical connections, and Dokow and Holzman (2005)
introduce minimal conditions of an algebraic kind. Other impossibility results
are given, for instance, in Dietrich (forthcoming), Dietrich and List (forthcom-
ing) and Nehring (2005). Possibilities of proposition-wise independent aggrega-
tion arise if the individual judgments fall into particular domains (List 2003) or
if logical connections are modelled via subjunctive implications (Dietrich 2005).
The proposition-wise independence condition is often criticised (e.g., Chap-
man 2002, Mongin 2005), but has rarely been weakened in the general aggre-
gation literature. The normative appeal of the condition is easily challenged
by concrete examples: why, for instance, should the collective judgment on
whether to introduce taxes on kerosene be independent of peoples judgments
on whether global warming should be prevented? The weaker independence
conditions proposed in the literature are special cases of III: each one is obtain-
able from some specication of relevance R. Let me mention the literatures
two most notable weakenings of proposition-wise independence.1
First, if relevance R is an equivalence relation, III becomes equivalent to an
issue-wise independence condition with possibly non-binary issues (see Example
3 below). Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) use such a non-binary independence
condition, and derive mathematically elegant representation results for deci-
sion problems and/or aggregation rules with a particular algebraic structure
(see footnote 16). In judgment aggregation, Claussen and Roisland (2005) in-
troduce a non-binary version of the discursive paradox and prove results on
when it occurs; in view of typical economic decision situations, they argue for
non-binary issues in judgment aggregation and use procedures satisfying a non-
binary independence condition. Also Pauly and van Hees(2006) multi-valued
logic approach can be viewed as using a non-binary independence condition.
1The rst one was not intended as a weakening of proposition-wise independence, but is
one under our division of the decision problem into (binary) decisions on propositions.
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The implicit binariness assumption in the proposition-wise independence con-
dition makes the setting inapplicable to Arrowian preference aggregation, since
"Arrowian issues" are in fact ternary: there are three ways (including indi¤er-
ence) to rank two distinct alternatives. However, strict preference aggregation
has binary issues, and some of the cited results do indeed imply Arrows Theo-
rem for strict preferences.2
The literatures second weakening of proposition-wise independence aimed
at representing not non-binariness but the di¤erent status of di¤erent propo-
sitions consists in applying the condition only to some propositions, e.g. to
"premises" (Dietrich 2006) or to atomic propositions (Mongin 2005). Mongin
(2005) argues that the collective judgment on a compound proposition like p^q
should not ignore how the individuals judge p and judge q; our relevance relation
R would then have to satisfy pRp ^ q and qRp ^ q.
In the rst part of the paper, I introduce the framework. I consider di¤erent
classes of relevance relations, and dene conditions of III, unanimity preserva-
tion and dictatorship that exactly generalise Arrows conditions of IIA, weak
Pareto and dictatorship (whereas the cited general aggregation literature uses
conditions stronger than Arrows). In the second part, I show that if rele-
vance connections and logical connections play together in certain ways, III
and unanimity preserving aggregation rules are degenerate. Di¤erent kinds
of connections lead to di¤erent forms of degenerate aggregation, ranging from
semi-vetodictatorship to strong dictatorship. As a corollary I obtain Arrows
Theorem, for the rst time (in the general aggregation literature) without ex-
cluding indi¤erences. In deriving conditions for impossibilities, I deliberately
sacrice some generality (of conditions on interconnections) for simplicity and
elegance.3
Many particular classes of relevance relations (some discussed below) are
potentially of interest. I believe that much work can and should be done to
investigate III aggregation for di¤erent classes. For instance, within suitable
classes say if relevance is transitive and relates in a systematic way to logical
connections there is a hope to obtain elegantminimal conditions for when non-
degenerate aggregation is (not) possible. Further, one should explore premise-
based and sequential prioritarian approaches (as explained later), and develop
a distance-based approach4 compatible with III. The development of di¤erent
types of III aggregation procedures should go hand in hand with developing
criteria for when to consider a proposition as relevant for another, i.e., for how
2Namely those by Wilson (1975), Dietrich and List (forthcoming) and Dokow and Holzman
(2005). Nehring (2003) derives an Arrow-like theorem.
3I make no conjecture on the nature of minimal conditions for impossibilities, except that
such conditions would not have a unied or structured form but the form of disjunctions of
several cases. The reason is that the conditions must capture the joint and non-separable
behaviour of relevance and logical connections, which is left general and uncontrolled in the
framework.
4E.g., Eckert and Pigozzi (2005) and (for fusion operators in articial intelligence)
Konieczny and Pino-Perez (2002).
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to dene R, hence for which informational restriction to impose. This second
research goal has a normative dimension. Reaching both goals would enable us
to give concrete recommendations for practical group decision-making.
2 Basic denitions
We consider a set N = f1; :::; ng of individuals, where n  2, faced with a
collective decision problem of a general kind.
Agenda, judgment sets. The agenda is an arbitrary non-empty (possibly innite)
set X of propositions on which a decision (acceptance or rejection) is needed.
The agenda includes negated propositions: X = fp;:p : p 2 X+g, where X+ is
some set of non-negated propositions and ":p" stands for "not p". Notationally,
double-negations cancel each other out.5 A judgment set is a set A  X of
(accepted) propositions; it is complete if it contains a member of each pair
p;:p 2 X ("no abstentions").
Logical interconnections. Not all judgment sets are consistent. For the agenda
X = fa;:a; b;:b; a ^ b;:(a ^ b)g, the (complete) judgment set fa; b;:(a ^ b)g
is inconsistent. Let J be a non-empty set of judgment sets, each containing
exactly one member of each pair p;:p 2 X, and suppose the consistent judg-
ment sets are precisely the sets in J and their subsets; all other judgment sets
are inconsistent.6 A judgment set A  X entails a proposition p 2 X (written
A ` p) if A [ f:pg is inconsistent. I write q ` p for fqg ` p.
It is natural (though for the present results not necessary) to take the
propositions in X to be statements of a formal language, and to take con-
sistency/entailment to be standard logical consistency/entailment, as is usually
assumed in the judgment aggregation literature. The formal language, if suf-
ciently expressive, can mimic the natural language in which the real decision
problem arises.7
A proposition p 2 X is a contradiction if fpg is inconsistent, and a tautology
if f:pg is inconsistent. I call A  X consistent with B  X if A [ B is
consistent; and I call A  X consistent with p 2 X (and p consistent with A) if
A [ fpg is consistent.
Aggregation. The (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to
every prole (A1; : : : ; An) of (individual) judgment sets (in some domain of
5That is: whenever I write ":q" (where q 2 X), I mean the other member of the pair
p;:p 2 X to which q belongs; hence "::q" stands for q.
6So J contains the consistent and complete judgment sets. Any set fp;:pg  X is
inconsistent. Any subset of a consistent set is consistent. Finally, ; is consistent, and any
consistent set has a superset that is consistent and complete (hence in J ).
7The formal language can be one of classical (propositional or predicate) logic or one of
a non-classical logic such as a modal logic, as long as the logic satises certain regularity
conditions. This follows Dietrichs (forthcoming) model of judgment aggregation in general
logics, which generalises List and Pettits (2002) original model in classical propositional logic.
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admissible proles) a (collective) judgment set F (A1; : : : ; An) = A  X. I will
require that F satises the standard input and output conditions: F allows as an
input all proles (A1; :::; An) of complete and consistent (individual) judgment
sets ("universal domain"); and F always generates a complete and consistent
(collective) judgment set ("collective rationality"). In summary, F is then a
function from J n to J . For instance, majority rule on J n is given by
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : jfi : p 2 Aigj > n=2g for all (A1; :::; An) 2 J n;
it usually violates collective rationality, i.e. takes values outside J .
Abstract aggregation. One may (re)interpret the elements of X as arbitrary
attributes, which may but need not be propositions/judgments, and may but
need not be expressed in formal logic. Then judgment sets become attribute
sets, and the aggregation rule maps proles of individual attribute sets to a
collective attribute set. Of course, the attribute holders i 2 N need not be
humans.
I give two examples here; more examples follow in the next section.
Example 1: preference aggregation. For a given set of (exclusive) alterna-
tives Q (jQj  3), consider the agenda
X := fxRy;:xRy : x; y 2 Qg (the preference agenda),
where xRy is the proposition "x is at least as good as y". Throughout the paper,
I often write xPy for :yRx. Let J be the set of all judgment sets A  X that
represent fully rational preferences, i.e., for which there exists a weak ordering8
 on Q such that
A = fxRy 2 X : x  yg [ f:xRy 2 X : x 6 yg.
Note that there is a bijective correspondence between weak orderings on Q and
judgment sets in J ; and between judgment aggregation rules F : J n ! J
and Arrowian social welfare functions (with universal domain). The agenda X
and its consistency notion belong to a predicate logic, as dened in Dietrich
(forthcoming), drawing on List and Pettit (2004).9
Example 2: judging values of and constraints between variables. Sup-
pose a group (e.g. a central banks board or research panel) debates the values
of di¤erent variables (e.g. macroeconomic variables measuring GDP, prices or
consumption). Let V be a non-empty set of "variables". For each V 2 V
let ran(V ) be a non-empty set of possible "values" of V (numbers or other ob-
jects), called the range of V . For any variable V 2 V and any value v 2 ran(V ),
8A weak ordering on Q is a binary relation  on Q that is reexive, transitive, and
connected (but not necessarily anti-symmetric, so that non-trivial indi¤erences are allowed).
9See Dietrich and List (forthcoming) for a logic representing strict preference aggregation.
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the group has to judge the proposition V = v stating that V takes the value
v.10 These judgments should respects the (causal) constraints between vari-
ables; but, not surprisingly, the nature of these constraints is itself disputed,
for instance because the group members believe in di¤erent (e.g. econometric)
estimation techniques. If the variables are real-valued, some linear constraints
like V + 3W   U = 5, or non-linear ones like V 2 = W , might be debated. Let
C be any non-empty set of "constraints" under consideration.11 The agenda is
given by
X = fV = v;:(V = v) : V 2 V; v 2 ran(V )g [ fc;:c : c 2 Cg.
A judgment set A  X thus states that certain variables do (not) take cer-
tain values, and that the variables do (not) constrain each other in certain
ways. To dene logical connections, note rst that some constraints may con-
ict with others (e.g., V > W conicts withW > V ), and that some constraints
may conict with other negated constraints (e.g., V log(W ) > 2 conicts with
:(V log(W ) > 0)). Let J  be some non-empty set containing for each con-
straint c 2 C either c or :c (not both); the sets in J  represent consistent
judgments on the constraints. Now let J be the set of all judgment sets A  X
containing exactly one member of each pair p;:p 2 X such that:12
(i) each variable V 2 V has a single value v 2 ran(V ) with V = v 2 A;
(ii) the family of values in (i) obeys all accepted constraints c 2 A \C;
(iii) the judgments on constraints are consistent: A \ fc;:c : c 2 Cg 2 J .
Note that it may be consistent to hold a negated constraint :c and yet to
assign values to variables in accordance with c. Indeed, variables can stand in
certain relations by pure coincidence, i.e. without a constraint to this e¤ect.13
3 Independence of irrelevant information
The two conditions I will impose on the aggregation rule are based on a rele-
vance relation, whose nature and interpretation is context-specic, as indicated
earlier. Such a relevance relation is not simply reducible to logical connections
(of inconsistency or entailment). Suppose the proposition a : "country x has
weapons of mass destruction" (and its negation :a) is considered relevant to
10More generally, the group might consider propositions stating that V s value belongs to
certain sets S  val(V ):
11A constraint might be formalised by a subset of the "joint range" V 2Vran(V ) of the
family of variables (V )V 2V (e.g. a subset of R3 if V consists of three real-valued variables),
or by an expression in a logical language (see below).
12It is easily possible to add exogenous constraints (which cannot be rejected, unlike those
in C), by further restricting in (iii) the allowed value assignments.
13More precisely, a constraint states not just an actual relation r between variables but a
necessary relation "necessarily r", that is (in modal logical terms) "in all possible worlds r"
(r). The negation of this constraint (:r) is equivalent to "possibly :r" (:r), which is
indeed consistent with "r", i.e. with the relation holding.
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the proposition b : "country x should be attacked" (and its negation :b), but
not vice versa. This asymmetry of relevance between the two issues need not
be reected in logical connections: J can be perfectly symmetric in the two
issues. This is clear if X contains no issues other than these two (logically in-
dependent) ones, i.e., if X = fa;:a; b;:bg. But even additional propositions in
X that create (indirect) logical links between the two issues need not reveal a
direction of relevance, as is seen from examples.14 Hence any relevance relation
derived from logical interconnections would have to declare the two issues as
either mutually relevant or mutually irrelevant.15
So relevance must be taken into the framework as an additional structure.
The following denition delimits what may count as a relevance relation.
Denition 1 (a) A set A  X settles p 2 X if A ` p or A ` :p.
(b) A binary relation R on X is a relevance relation (where "rRp" means "r
is relevant to p") if every p 2 X is settled by every consistent set A that
contains either r or :r for every proposition r 2 X with rRp.
So R is a relevance relation if the truth value of any p 2 X is determined
by the truth values of the propositions relevant to p. The latter requirement
seems indeed a plausible (necessary) condition on the notion of "relevance". For
instance, R is a relevance relation if R is reexive, i.e. if every proposition is
self-relevant. But R need not be reexive: for instance, one may assume that
to a conjunction p ^ q only the conjuncts p and q are relevant, not p ^ q itself.
In the following, let R be an arbitrary relevance relation, and let R(p)
denote the set fr 2 X : rRpg of propositions relevant to p 2 X. The following
condition requires the collective judgment on any proposition p 2 X to be
formed on the basis of how the individuals judge the propositions relevant to p.
Independence of Irrelevant Information (III). For all propositions p 2 X
and all proles (A1; :::; An) and (A1; :::; A

n) in the domain, if Ai \ R(p) =
Ai \R(p) for every individual i then p 2 F (A1; :::; An), p 2 F (A1; :::; An).
This informational constraint on aggregation strongly depends on how rel-
evance is specied. Roughly, the more propositions are relevant to each other,
the weaker III is. III is empty if all propositions are relevant to all propositions,
i.e., if R = XX. III is the standard proposition-wise independence condition
14Suppose X = fa;:a; a ! b;:(a ! b); b;:bg. The symmetry argument is simple. A
truth-value assignment (t1; t2; t3) 2 fT; Fg3 to the propositions a; a ! b;:b is consistent if
and only if (t3; t2; t1) (in which the truth-values of a and :b are interchanged) is consistent.
This is so whether a! b represents a subjunctive or a material implication. In the rst case,
the only inconsistent truth-value assignment is (T; T; T ). In the second case, there are other
inconsistent truth-value assignments (as a! b is equivalent to :a _ b), yet without breaking
the symmetry between a and :b.
15One might extract the intended asymmetric relevance structure from the syntax of the
propositions in X. A syntactically founded relevance denition is plausible for some but not
all agendas.
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if each proposition is just self-relevant, i.e., R(p) = fpg for all p 2 X. III is
Gärdenfors"weak" (yet still quite strong) independence if R(p) = fp;:pg for
all p 2 X. III is Dietrichs (2006) independence restricted to a subset Y  X
if R(p) = fpg for p 2 Y and R(p) = X for p 2 XnY . III is Mongins (2005)
independence restricted to the atomic propositions (of an agenda X in a propo-
sitional language) if R(p) = fpg for atomic p and R(p) = X for compound p
(e.g. p = a ^ :b).
I now discuss further examples of relevance relations. In these examples, I
assume relevance does not distinguish between a proposition and its negation:
pRq , ~pR~q for all p; q 2 X and all ~p 2 fp;:pg, ~q 2 fq;:qg: (1)
So R is given by its restriction on the set X+  X of non-negated propositions.
Example 1 (continued). I assume throughout that for the preference agenda
X relevance is dened by
R(xRy) = fxRy;:xRy; yRx;:yRxg for all xRy 2 X; (2)
so it is relevant to xRy whether or not xRy and whether or not yRx. Then III
is equivalent to Arrows independence of irrelevant alternatives ("IIA"), while
the standard proposition-wise independence condition is stronger than IIA.
Example 2 (continued). For the agenda of Example 2, one might put
R(V = v) = fV = v0;:(V = v0) : v0 2 ran(V )g for all V = v 2 X
R(c) = fc;:cg for all constraints c 2 C.
(3)
On a modied assumption, some distinct constraints c; c0 2 Cmight be declared
relevant to each other, for instance if they concern the same variables.
Example 3: relevance as an equivalence relation, and non-binary is-
sues. Examples 1 and 2 are instances of the general case where relevance is an
equivalence relation, that is, R is reexive (requiring self-relevance), symmetric,
and transitive. Each of these three conditions is a substantial assumption on the
notion of relevance. The agenda X is then partitioned into equivalence classes
(of inter-relevant propositions), each one interpretable as an "issue"; and III
is an issue-wise independence condition. An issue may be binary (of the form
fp;:pg) or non-binary. For the preference agenda (Example 1), an issue takes
the form fxRy;:xRy; yRx;:yRxg (for options x; y 2 Q): the issue of how to
rank x relative to y. Rubinstein and Fishburns (1986) algebraic aggregation
problem can be viewed as one of the present type, where each issue consists in
specifying a value in an algebraic eld.16
16Their aggregation problem is also comparable to a variant of Example 2, in which the
inter-variable constraints are exogenously imposed (rather than under decision), and all
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Example 4: relevance as premisehood, and generalised premise-based
rules. If we interpret "rRp" as "r is a premise/reason/argument for (or against)
p", III is the condition that the aggregation rule be premise-based : that the
collective judgment on any proposition p 2 X be determined by how the indi-
viduals judge ps premises.
In principle, R could dene an arbitrarily complex premisehood structure
over a possibly complex agenda X, generalising the so-called premise-based pro-
cedure usually dened for simple agendas like X+ = fa; b; a^ bg. For the latter
agenda, this procedure decides each "premise" a and b by a (majority) vote,
and decides a ^ b by logical entailment from the decisions on a and b; which
satises III for the following relevance ("premisehood") relation:
the only inter-relevances within X+ are aRa, bRb, aRa ^ b, bRa ^ b. (4)
Call p 2 X a root proposition if p has no premise other than p (and :p). In (4),
a and b are root propositions. Any root proposition p 2 X must be a premise
to itself: otherwise p would have no premises at all, violating the denition of
a relevance relation.17 So the collective judgment on any root proposition p is
(by III) formed solely on the basis of peoples judgments on p via some voting
method majority voting if we stick closely to the standard premise-based
procedure while decisions on non-root propositions may depend on external
premises.
When interpreting R as a premisehood relation, additional requirements on
R may be appropriate. Surely, symmetry should not be required (unlike in
Examples 1-3). Indeed, one might require that R is anti-symmetric on X+ (to
prevent distinct propositions in X+ from being premises to each other) or, more
strongly, acyclic on X+: there are no pairwise distinct p1; :::; pm 2 X+ (m  2)
with p1Rp2Rp3R:::RpmRp1.18
Example 5: relevance as a transitive relation, and sequential priority
rules. In Example 4, there may not exist any non-degenerate premise-based
(i.e., III) aggregation rule F : J n ! J . An impossibility threat comes not only
from logical interconnections between root propositions (or other propositions),
but also from transitivity violations of relevance R. To see why, let p 2 X
and suppose the premises of ps premises call them the "pre-premises" are
not premises of p. The decision on p is settled by the decisions on ps premises
variables range over the same algebraic eld F (e.g. R); so the agenda is X = fV =
v;:(V = v) : V 2 V and v 2 Fg, and the issues (equivalence classes) are the sets
fV = v;:(V = v) : v 2 Fg, V 2 V. Their two main theorems establish, in a di¤erent
framework, correspondences between algebraic properties (like being a hyperplane) of the set
J of allowed judgment sets (represented as a subset B of the F-vector space FV) and alge-
braic properties (like linearity or additivity) of "admissible" aggregation rules F (represented
as mappings from Bn to B). Although the algebraic conditions on J or F exclude many
applications, they can be applied notably to probability aggregation problems.
17Unless p is a tautology or contradiction: then even the empty set settles p.
18Or one might require only that the asymmetric part of R is acyclic.
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(as R is a relevance relation), which in turn depend (by III) on how people
judge the pre-premises. This forces the decision on p to be some function f
of how people judge the pre-premises. But by III the decision on p must be a
function of how people judge ps premises (not pre-premises). So f depends on
peoples pre-premise judgments only indirectly: only through peoples premise
judgments as entailed by their pre-premise judgments a strong restriction on
f that suggests that impossibility is looming.
It is debatable whether premisehood (more generally, relevance) is inherently
a transitive concept. IfR is assumed transitive whether for conceptual reasons
or just to remove one impossibility source an interesting potential candidates
for III aggregation arises, to be explained now. List (2004) introduces sequential
priority rules in judgment aggregation (generalising sequential rules in standard
social choice theory). Here the propositions of a (nite) agenda are put in a
priority order p1; :::; pk (k = jXj) and decided sequentially, where earlier decision
logically constrain later ones. As is easily seen, such a rule is III if relevance is
dened by pjRpl , j  l for all j; l = 1; :::; k. I now introduce similar rules
relative to an arbitrary relevance relation, and I show that they are III provided
that relevance is transitive (and well-founded). Informally, these rules decide
the propositions sequentially in the order of relevance: each p 2 X is decided
by logical entailment from previously accepted relevant propositions except if
the latter propositions do not settle p, in which case p is decided via some local
decision method (e.g. via majority voting on p). Formally, F is a sequential
priority rule if F has universal domain and for every proposition p 2 X+ there
is a an aggregation rule Dp for the binary agenda fp;:pg (satisfying universal
domain and collective rationality) such that, for all proles (A1; : : : ; An) 2 J n,
F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg =
8<:
f~p 2 fp;:pg : F (A1; :::; An)\ if this set is
(R(p)nfp;:pg) ` ~pg non-empty
Dp(A1 \ fp;:pg; :::; An \ fp;:pg) otherwise.
(5)
So the rule rst decides for every root proposition p 2 X+ which of p;:p to
accept, based on which of p;:p the individuals accept. Then it turns to any
non-root proposition p 2 X+ to which only root proposition (and possibly p and
:p) are relevant: if the previous decisions on the root propositions relevant to
p entail p or :p, the entailed proposition(s) is (are) accepted (hence "sequential
priority"); otherwise a local vote is taken on p. And so on.
Sequential priority rules can be constructed by (i) specifying a family (Dp)p2X+
of ("local") aggregation rules (for instance the same rule Dp for all p 2 X+),
and (ii) applying formula (5) recursively. This uniquely denes the sequential
priority rule F  F(Dp)p2X+ (by the transnite recursion theorem19) provided
that relevanceR is a well-founded relation onX+: every non-empty set S  X+
has an R-minimal element s (i.e., for no r 2 Snfsg, rRs); or, more intuitively,
19To be precise, for every (A1; :::; An) 2 J n, F (A1; :::; An) is the union of the sets f(p) :=
F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg, p 2 X+, where the function f is dened on X+ by recursion on R.
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there is no innite sequence p1; p2; ::: 2 X+ such that for all pk the successor
pk+1 is relevant to (and distinct from) pk. This exclusion of "innite relevance
chains" is again a debatable assumption on the notion of relevance.
We obtain the desired III property by a (transnite) inductive argument:
Proposition 1 If relevance R is transitive and well-founded on X+ and satis-
es (1), every sequential priority rule F(Dp)p2X+ satises III.
20
Proof. Let R be as specied, and let F := F(Dp)p2X+ be a sequential pri-
ority rule. To show III, I prove that all p 2 X+ satisfy the following: for all
(A1; :::; An); (A

1; :::; A

n) 2 J n, if Ai \R(p) = Ai \R(p) for all i then
F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg = F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg 6= ;: (6)
Suppose for a contradiction that the latter fails for some p 2 X+. By well-
foundedness, there exists an R-minimal p 2 X+ for which it fails. So there are
(A1; :::; An); (A

1; :::; A

n) 2 J n with Ai \ R(p) = Ai \ R(p) for all i such that
(6) is false. By ps minimality property and Rs transitivity,
F (A1; :::; An) \ (R(p)nfp;:pg) = F (A1; :::; An) \ (R(p)nfp;:pg): (7)
Let Y := f~p 2 fp;:pg : the set (7) entails ~pg.
Case 1 : Y 6= ;. Then, by the rst case in (5); F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg =
Y , and for the same reason F (A1; :::; A

n) \ fp;:pg = Y . This implies (6),
contradicting the choice of p.
Case 2 : Y = ;. Then p;:p 2 R(p): otherwise p;:p 62 R(p) by (1),
implying that the set (7) contains a member of each pair r;:r 2 R(p) (using ps
minimality property), hence entails p or :p (as R is a relevance relation), which
contradicts that Y = ;. By p;:p 2 R(p), we have Ai \ fp;:pg = Ai \ fp;:pg
for all i. So, as for both proles the second case in (5) applies (by Y = ;),
F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg and F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg both equal the same (non-
empty) set generated by Dp. So (6) holds, contradicting the choice of p. 
4 A unanimity condition
It would be against the spirit of our relevance-based approach to require for
every p 2 X that a unanimity for p be socially preserved: this would deny that
disagreements on other propositions relevant to pmatter. I will impose a weaker
condition of unanimity preservation: one restricted to propositions p 2 X such
that a unanimity for p excludes disagreements on propositions relevant to p.
A special case will be Arrows weak Pareto principle, which is also a restricted
unanimity preservation condition.
20Of course, III is not the only desideratum on F(Dp)p2X+ . One might investigate for which
types of logical and relevance connections there exist (non-degenerate) local decision methods
Dp, p 2 X+, such that the outcomes of F(Dp)p2X+ are consistent (hence in J ).
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Formally, for all p 2 X, a set A  fr;:r : r 2 R(p)g is called a p-relevant
judgment set, as it represents judgments on propositions relevant to p; and Rp
denotes the set of all p-relevant judgment sets that are consistent with p and
complete (i.e. contain for each r 2 R(p) either r or :r). Each A 2 Rp actually
entails p, as R is a relevance relation. The sets in Rp represent those truth-
value assignments to the propositions relevant to p for which p rather than :p
follows. If R(p) = fpg (only p is relevant to p), Rp contains only fpg (or is
empty if p is a contradiction). But usually Rp is more complex.21
In the following, let P be a xed set of ("privileged") propositions p 2 X for
which jRpj = 1. If all individuals hold p 2 P, they cannot (rationally) disagree
on propositions relevant to p, as they must all hold the single set in Rp; and so
we may require this unanimity to be preserved socially.
Unanimity Preservation. For every prole (A1; :::; An) in the domain and
every privileged proposition p 2 P, if p 2 Ai for all individuals i then p 2
F (A1; :::; An).
I assume throughout that for the preference agenda P is dened as
P := f:xRy : x; y 2 Q; x 6= yg = fyPx : x; y 2 Q; x 6= yg, (8)
the set of strict ranking propositions yPx (where jRyPxj = 1 by footnote 21);
this makes unanimity preservation equivalent to the weak Pareto principle.
If each p 2 X has R(p) = fpg (and is not a contradiction), then we may de-
ne P = X, so that unanimity preservation applies globally. In the earlier exam-
ple of X+ = fa; b; a^bg with relevance given by (4) and (1), P may contain a^b
(asRa^b = ffa; bgg) but not :(a^b) (asR:(a^b) = ff:a; bg; fa;:bg; f:a;:bgg).
So a unanimity for :(a ^ b) can be overruled.
By default (i.e., if P is not explicitly dened otherwise), let
P := fp 2 X : jRpj = 1g.
This maximal choice of P is often natural (though not necessary for our results).
For the preference agenda, (8) is the default specication.22
5 Semi-vetodictatorship and semi-dictatorship
From now on, we consider an III and unanimity preserving aggregation rule
F : J n ! J , relative to some arbitrary xed relevance relation R. I show
21For all xRy in the preference agenda (with x 6= y and relevance given by (2)), RxRy
contains fxRy; yRxg ("x and y are indi¤erent") and fxRy;:yRxg ("x is better than y");
and R:xRy contains just f:xRy; yRxg. If b 2 X and R(b) = fa; a ! b; bg (where a and b
are distinct atomic propositions and ! is material implication), Rb contains fa; a ! b; bg
and f:a; a! b; bg. In general, for any p 2 X, Rp contains the restrictions of full judgments
sets A 2 J containing p to the propositions that are relevant to p or negated relevant to p:
Rp = fA \ fr;:r : r 2 R(p)g : A 2 J with p 2 Ag.
22Except that (8) excludes the tautologies xRx 2 X from P, but this makes no di¤erence
as any aggregation rule F : J n ! J trivially preserves unanimities for tautologies.
13
that if the interconnections between propositions in terms of relevance and
logic play together in certain ways, F is forced to be of a degenerate form: a
(semi-)dictatorship or (semi-)vetodictatorship.
First, how should these degenerate rules be dened? Our relevance-based
framework allows us to generalise the standard social-choice-theoretic deni-
tions. Recall that an (Arrowian) "dictator" is an individual who can socially
enforce his strict preferences between options, but not necessarily his indi¤er-
ences. Similarly, a "vetodictator" can prevent ("veto") any strict preference,
but not necessarily any indi¤erence. Put in our terminology, a dictator (vetod-
ictator) can enforce (veto) any privileged proposition of the preference agenda
(see (8)). The following denitions generalise this to arbitrary agendas.
Denition 2 An individual i is
(a) a dictator (respectively, semi-dictator) if, for every privileged proposition
p 2 P, we have p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all (A1; :::; An) 2 J n such that
p 2 Ai (respectively, such that p 2 Ai and p 62 Aj, j 6= i);
(b) a vetodictator (respectively, semi-vetodictator) if, for every privileged
proposition p 2 P, i has a veto (respectively, semi-veto) on p, i.e. a
judgment set Ai 2 J not containing p such that p 62 F (A1; :::; An) for all
Aj 2 J , j 6= i (respectively, for all Aj 2 J , j 6= i, containing p).
In the standard models without a relevance relation, conditional entailments
between propositions (rst used by Nehring and Puppe 2002/2005) have proven
useful to understand agendas. Roughly, p 2 X conditionally entails q 2 X if p
together with other propositions in X entails q (with a condition on the "other"
propositions to make it non-trivial). I will not use conditional entailments
here, as they reect only logical connections between propositions. Rather, I
now dene constrained entailments, a related notion that reects both logical
and relevance connections. It will turn out that certain paths of constrained
entailments lead to degenerate aggregation rules.23
Denition 3 For propositions p; q 2 X, if fpg [ Y ` q for a set Y  P
consistent with every set in Rp and every set in R:q, I say that p constrained
entails q (in virtue of Y ), and I write p ` q or p `Y q.24
23Nehring and Puppe (2002/2005) use paths of conditional entailment to dene their totally
blocked agendas. Total blockedness (and Dietrich and Lists (forthcoming) pathconnectedness
condition) can be obtained from our path condition by a particular specication of R and P
(see footnote 27). For totally blocked agendas, Nehring and Puppe obtain strong dictatorship
by imposing that F satises proposition-wise independence, an unrestricted unanimity con-
dition, and a monotonicity condition. Dokow and Holzman (2005) show that monotonicity
can be replaced by an algebraic agenda condition. I impose relevance-based conditions on F ,
and obtain less than strong dictatorship.
24Many alternative notions of constrained entailment turn out to be non-suitable: they
do not preserve interesting properties along paths of constrained entailments. The present
denition is the weakest one to preserve semi-winning coalitions. The requirement that Y  P
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The amount of constrained entailments in X is crucial for whether impos-
sibilities arise. Trivially, every unconditional entailment is also a constrained
entailment (namely in virtue of Y = ;). Intuitively, the more inter-relevances
there are between propositions, the larger the sets Rp, p 2 X, tend to be and
also the smaller the set of privileged propositions P tends to be; so the stronger
the demands on Y in constrained entailments; hence the fewer constrained en-
tailments, and the more room for possibility.
The preference agenda X (Example 1) displays many constrained entail-
ments (hence impossibilities). For instance, xRy `fyPzg xPz (if x; y; z are pair-
wise distinct options), as yPz is in P and is consistent with all sets in RxRy
and all sets in R:xPz = RzRy (see footnote 21). By contrast, no non-trivial
constrained entailments arise in our example X+ = fa; b; a ^ bg with relevance
given by (4) and (1); for instance, it is not the case that a `f:(a^b)g :b since
:(a ^ b) 62 P; and it is not the case that a `fbg a ^ b, as fbg is inconsistent
with fa;:bg 2 R:(a^b). As a result, our impossibilities will not apply to this
agenda and cannot, as the premise-based procedure for odd n (see Example
4) satises all conditions.
To obtain impossibility results, richness in constrained entailments is not
su¢ cient. At least one constrained entailment p ` q must hold in a "truly"
constrained sense. By this I mean more than that p does not unconditionally
entail q, i.e. more than that p is consistent with :q: I mean that every set
A 2 Rp is consistent with every set B 2 R:q.
Denition 4 For propositions p; q 2 X, p truly constrained entails q if p ` q
and moreover every A 2 Rp is consistent with every B 2 R:q.
For instance, if relevance is an equivalence relation (as in Example 3) that
partitions X into pairwise logically independent subagendas25 (as for the pref-
erence agenda) then all constrained entailments across equivalence classes are
truly constrained. Also, p ` q is truly constrained if p 6` q and moreover p and
q are root propositions as dened in Examples 4 and 5.
Our impossibility results rest on the following path conditions.
Denition 5 (a) For propositions p; q 2 X, ifX contains propositions p1; :::; pm
(m  2) with p = p1 ` p2 ` ::: ` pm = q, I write p `` q; if moreover one
of these constrained entailments is truly constrained, I write p ``true q.
(b) A set Z  X is pathlinked (in X) if p `` q for all p; q 2 Z, and truly
pathlinked (in X) if moreover p ``true q for some (hence all) p; q 2 Z.
While pathlinkedness forces to a (limited) form of neutral aggregation (see
Lemma 3), true pathlinkedness forces to the following degenerate aggregation
rules.
allows one to apply unanimity preservation. In view of di¤erent results to those derived here,
it might be fruitful to impose additional requirements on Y , e.g. that Y be consistent also
with sets in R:p and/or in Rq.
25That is, if X1; X2 are distinct subagendas, A [ B is consistent for all consistent A 
X1; B  X2.
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Theorem 1 If the set P of privileged propositions is inconsistent and truly
pathlinked, there is a semi-vetodictator.
Theorem 2 If the set fp;:p : p 2 Pg of privileged or negated privileged propo-
sitions is truly pathlinked, there is a semi-dictator.
In the present (and all later) theorems, the qualication "truly" can be
dropped if relevance is restricted to taking a form for which pathlinkedness (of
the set in question) implies true pathlinkedness, for instance if R is restricted
to being an equivalence relation that partitions X into logically independent
subagendas.26
Under the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2, there may be more than one
semi-(veto)dictator, and moreover there need not exist any (veto)dictator.27
There are many applications. The preference agenda (Example 1) is dis-
cussed later. If in Example 4 or 5 we let P be the set of root propositions,
and if these root propositions are interconnected in the sense of Theorem 2
(1), then some individual is semi-(veto)decisive on all "fundamental issues";
and hence, premise-based or sequential prioritarian aggregation rules take a de-
generate form (at least with respect to the local decision methods Dp for root
propositions p 2 X). Let me discuss Example 2 in more detail.
Example 2 (continued) For many instances of this aggregation problem (of
judging values of and constraints between variables), the conditions of Theorems
1 and 2 hold, so that semi-(veto)dictatorships are the only solutions. To make
this point, let relevance be again given by (3), and let the privileged propositions
be given by
P = fV = v : V 2 V&v 2 ran(V )g [ fc;:c : c 2 Cg. (9)
26The argument for the latter is as follows. By Lemma 1, all constrained entailments within
any of the subagendas are unconditional entailments. This implies that the pathlinked set in
question contains propositions linked by a path containing a constrained entailment across
subagendas. The latter is truly constrained by an earlier remark.
27Suppose R(p) = p for all p 2 X (only self -relevance allowed), P = X (all proposi-
tions privileged), and jXj < 1. Then constrained entailment reduces to simple conditional
entailment, and hence pathlinkedness of X reduces to Nehring and Puppes (2002/2005)
total blockedness condition whereby there is a path of conditional entailments between
any p; q 2 X. Dokow and Holzman (2005) show that parity rules F , dened on J n by
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : jfi 2 M : p 2 Aigj is oddg for an odd-sized subgroup M  N ,
take values in J for certain agendas X that are totally blocked (hence pathlinked, in fact
truly pathlinked) and satisfy an algebraic condition. Such a parity rule is also III and una-
nimity preserving, and hence provides the required counterexample because every i 2 M
a semi-dictator and a semi-vetodictator, but not a dictator and not a vetodictator (unless
jM j = 1).
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Also, let jVj  2 (to make it interesting), and assume28
f:c : c 2 Cg 62 J . (10)
First, consider Theorem 1. Obviously, P is inconsistent, as C 6= ; by (10).
Often, P is also truly pathlinked. The latter could be shown by establishing
that
(a) P1 := fV = v : V 2 V&v 2 ran(V )g is truly pathlinked, and
(b) for all c 2 C there are p; q; r; s 2 P1 with c ` p, q ` c, :c ` r, s ` :c.
Part (a) might even hold in the sense of, for all V = v; V 0 = v0 2 P1 with
V 6= V 0, a truly constrained entailment V = v ` V 0 = v0 (rather than an
indirect path V = v `` V 0 = v0); indeed, there might be a set of constraints
C  C and a set of value assignments D  P1 such that V = v `C[D V 0 = v0
(hence, under the constraints in C, the set of value assignments fV = vg [D
implies that V 0 = v0).
Part (b) might hold for the following reasons. Consider a constraint c 2 C.
Plausibly, V = v `D :c for some V = v 2 P1 and D  P1; here, fV = vg [D
is a set of value assignments violating the constraint c. It is also plausible
that c `D V = v for some V = v 2 P1 and some D  P1; here, the value
assignments in D imply, under the constraint c, that V = v. Moreover, we
could have V = v `D c for some V = v 2 P1 and D  P1: this is so if
the set of value assignments fV = vg [ D violates all constraints in C except
c, hence entails c by (10). Finally, we could have :c ` ~C[D V = v for some
V = v 2 P1 and D  P1, and some set ~C of negated constraints; indeed,
suppose f:cg [ ~C contains the negations of all except of one constraint in C,
hence entails the remaining constraint by (10); under this remaining constraint,
the value assignments in D could imply that V = v.
Now consider Theorem 2. The special form (9) of P in fact implies that
the conditions of Theorem 2 hold whenever those of Theorem 1 hold (hence in
many cases, as argued above). Specically, let P be truly pathlinked. To prove
that also fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly pathlinked, it su¢ ces to show that, for all
V = v 2 P, there is a p 2 P with :(V = v) `` p and p `` :(V = v). Consider
any V = v 2 P, and choose any p 2 C ( P). As P is pathlinked and by (9)
contains :p and V = v, we have :p `` V = v and V = v `` :p; hence (using
Lemma 4 below) :(V = v) `` p and p `` :(V = v), as desired.
I now derive lemmas that will help both prove the theorems and understand
constrained entailment. I rst give a su¢ cient condition for when a constrained
entailment reduces to an unconditional entailment.
Lemma 1 For all p; q 2 X with R(p)  R(:q) or R(:q)  R(p), p ` q if
and only if p ` q.
28Condition (10) requires that at least one constraint between variables holds, i.e. that the
variables are not totally independent from each other. This assumption is natural in cases
where the question is not whether but only how the variables a¤ect each other, as it is the
case for macroeconomic variables.
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Proof. Let p; q be as specied. Obviously, p ` q implies p `; q. Suppose for
a contradiction that p ` q, say p `Y q, but p 6` q. Then fp;:qg is consistent.
So there is an B 2 J containing p and :q. Then
 the set B \ fr;:r : rRpg is consistent with p, so is in Rp;
 the set B \ fr;:r : rR:qg is consistent with :q, so is in R:q.
One of these two sets is a superset of the other one, as R(p)  R(:q) or
R(:q)  R(p); call this superset A. As p `Y q, A [ Y is consistent. So, as
A ` p and A ` :q, fp;:qg [ Y is consistent. It follows that fpg [ Y 6` q, in
contradiction to p `Y q. 
The next fact helps in choosing the set Y in a constrained entailment.
Lemma 2 For all p; q 2 X, if p ` q then p `Y q for some set Y containing no
proposition relevant to p or to :q.
Proof. Let p; q 2 X, and assume p ` q, say p `Y q. The proof is done
by showing that p `Y n(R(p)[R(:q)) q. Suppose for a contradiction that not
p `Y n(R(p)[R(:q)) q. Then
(*) fp;:qg [ Y n(R(p) [R(:q)) is consistent.
I show that
(**) p ` p0 for all p0 2 Y \R(p) and :q ` q0 for all q0 2 Y \R(:q),
which together with (*) implies that fp;:qg[Y is consistent, a contradiction
since p `Y q. Suppose for a contradiction that p0 2 Y \ R(p) but p 6` p0. Then
there is a B 2 J containing p and :p0. The set A := B\fr;:r : rRpg does not
entail :p, hence entails p (as R is a relevance relation), i.e. A 2 Rp. So A [ Y
is consistent (as p `Y q), a contradiction since A [ Y contains both p0 and :p0.
For analogous reasons, for all q0 2 Y \X l it cannot be that :q 6` q0. 
Now I introduce notions of decisive and semi-decisive coalitions, and I show
that semi-decisiveness is preserved along paths of constrained entailments.
Denition 6 A possibly empty coalition C  N is decisive (respectively, semi-
decisive) for p 2 X if its members have judgment sets Ai 2 J , i 2 C, containing
p, such that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC (respectively, for all
Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, not containing p).
While a decisive coalition for p can (by appropriate judgment sets) always
socially enforce p, a semi-decisive coalition can do so provided all other indi-
viduals reject p. Let W(p) and C(p) be the sets of decisive and semi-decisive
coalitions for p 2 X, respectively.
Lemma 3 For all p; q 2 X, if p ` q then C(p)  C(q). In particular, if Z  X
is pathlinked, all p 2 Z have the same semi-decisive coalitions.29
29Constrained entailments preserve semi-decisiveness but usually not decisiveness.
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Proof. Suppose p; q 2 X, and p ` q, say p `Y q, where by Lemma 2
w.l.o.g. Y \ R(p) = Y \ R(:q) = ;. Let C 2 C(p). So there are sets Ai 2 J ,
i 2 C, containing p, such that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC,
containing :p. By Y s consistency with every A 2 Rp, it is possible to change
each Ai, i 2 C, into a set (still in J ) that contains every y 2 Y and has the
same intersection withR(p) as Ai; this change preserves the required properties,
i.e. it preserves that p 2 Ai for all i 2 C (as R is a relevance relation), and
preserves that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, containing :p (by
Y \ R(p) = ; and III). So we may assume w.l.o.g. that Y  Ai for all i 2 C.
Hence, by fpg [ Y ` q, all Ai, i 2 C, contain q.
To establish that C 2 C(q), I consider any sets Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, all
containing :q, and I show that q 2 F (A1; :::; An). We may assume w.l.o.g. that
Y  Ai for all i 2 NnC, by an argument like the one above (using that Y is
consistent with all A 2 R:q, R is a relevance relation, Y \ R(:q) = ;, and
III). As f:qg [ Y ` :p, all Ai, i 2 NnC, contain :p. Hence p 2 F (A1; :::; An).
Moreover, Y  F (A1; :::; An) by Y  P. So, as fpg [ Y ` q, q 2 F (A1; :::; An),
as desired. 
I now prove the two theorems, after stating a last (obvious) lemma.
Lemma 4 (contraposition) For all p; q 2 X and all Y  P, p `Y q if and only
if :q `Y :p.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let P be inconsistent and truly pathlinked. I rst
prepare the proof by establishing three simple claims.
Claim 1. (i) The set C(p) is the same for all p 2 P; call it C0. (ii) The set
C(:p) is the same for all p 2 P.
Part (i) follows from Lemma 3. Part (ii) follows from it too because, by
Lemma 4, f:p : p 2 Pg is like P pathlinked, q.e.d.
Claim 2. ; 62 C0 and N 2 C0.
By unanimity preservation, N 2 C0. Suppose for a contradiction that ; 2 C0.
Consider any judgment set A 2 J . Then F (A; :::; A) contains all p 2 P, by
N 2 C0 if p 2 A, and by ; 2 C0 if p 62 A. Hence F (A; :::; A) is inconsistent, a
contradiction, q.e.d.
By Claim 2, there is a minimal coalition C in C0 (with respect to inclusion),
and C 6= ;. By C 6= ;, there is a j 2 C. Write C j := Cnfjg. As P is truly
pathlinked, there exist p 2 P and r; s 2 X such that p `` r, r ` s truly, and
s `` p.
Claim 3. C(r) = C(s) = C0; hence C 2 C(r) and C j 62 C(s).
By Lemma 3, C(p)  C(r)  C(s)  C(p). So C(r) = C(s) = C(p) = C0,
q.e.d.
Now let Y be such that r `Y s, where by Lemma 2 w.l.o.g. Y \ R(r) =
Y \R(:s) = ;. By C 2 C(r), there are judgment sets Ai 2 J , i 2 C, containing
r, such that r 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, not containing r. I
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assume w.l.o.g. that
for all i 2 C j, Y  Ai, hence (by frg [ Y ` s) s 2 Ai; (11)
which I may do by an argument like that in the proof of Lemma 3 (using that Y
is consistent with all A 2 Rr, R is a relevance relation, Y \R(r) = ;, and III).
By (11) and as C j 62 C(s) (see Claim 3), there are sets Bi 2 J , i 2 NnC j,
containing :s, such that, writing Bi := Ai for all i 2 C j,
:s 2 F (B1; :::; Bn). (12)
I may w.l.o.g. modify the sets Bi, i 2 NnC j, into new sets in J as long as
their intersections with R(:s) stays the same (because the new sets then still
contain :s as R is a relevance relation, and still satisfy (12) by III). First, I
modify the set Bi for i = j: as r ` s truly, Bj \ ft;:t : t 2 R(:s)g (2 R:s) is
consistent with any A 2 Rr, hence with Aj \ ft;:t : t 2 R(r)g, so that I may
assume that Aj \ ft;:t : t 2 R(r)g  Bj; which implies that
Bi \R(r) = Ai \R(r) for all i 2 C. (13)
Second, I modify the sets Bi, i 2 NnC: I assume (using that Y \ R(:s) = ;
and Y s consistency with every A 2 R:s) that
for all i 2 NnC, Y  Bi, hence (as f:sg [ Y ` :r) :r 2 Bi. (14)
The denition of the sets Ai, i 2 C, and (14) imply, via (13) and III, that
r 2 F (B1; :::; Bn). (15)
By (12), (15), and the inconsistency of fr;:sg [ Y , the set Y is not a subset of
F (B1; :::; Bn). So there is a y 2 Y with y 62 F (B1; :::; Bn). We have fjg 2 C(:yg
for the following two reasons.
 Bj contains :y; otherwise y 2 Bi for all i 2 N , so that y 2 F (B1; :::; Bn)
by y 2 P.
 Consider any sets Ci 2 J , i 6= j, not containing :y, i.e. containing y.
I show that :y 2 A := F (C1; :::; Cj 1; Bj; Cj+1; :::; Cn). For all i 6= j,
Ci \ ft;:t : t 2 R(y)g is consistent with y, hence is in Ry; as Ry for
analogous reasons also contains Bi\ft;:t : t 2 R(y)g and as jRyj = 1 (by
y 2 P), it follows that Ci\R(y) = Bi\R(y). Hence, by y 62 F (B1; :::; Bn)
and III, y 62 A. So :y 2 A, as desired.
By fjg 2 C(:y) and Claim 1, fjg 2 C(:q) for all q 2 P. So j is a semi-
vetodictator. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let fp;:p : p 2 Pg be truly pathlinked. I will reduce
the proof to that of Theorem 1. I start again with two simple claims.
Claim 1. The set C(q) is the same for all q 2 fp;:p : p 2 Pg; call it C0.
This follows immediately from Lemma 3, q.e.d.
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Claim 2. ; 62 C0 and N 2 C0.
By unanimity-preservation, N 2 C(p) for all p 2 P; hence N 2 C0. This
implies, for all p 2 P, that ; 62 C(:p); hence ; 62 C0, q.e.d.
Now by an analogous argument to that in the proof of Theorem 1, but based
this time on the present Claims 1 and 2 rather than on the two rst claims in
Theorem 1s proof, one can show that there exists an individual j such that
fjg 2 C(:q) for all q 2 P. So, by the present Claim 1 (which is stronger than
the rst claim in Theorem 1s proof),
fjg 2 C(q) for all q 2 P : (16)
So j is a semi-dictator, for the following reason. Let q 2 P and let (A1; :::; An) 2
J n be such that q 2 Aj and q 62 Ai, i 6= j. By (16) there is a set Bj 2 J
containing q such that q 2 F (B1; :::; Bn) for all Bi 2 J , i 6= j, not containing
q. Since jRqj = 1 (by q 2 P), and since Rq contains Aj \ ft;:t : t 2 R(q)g and
Bj\ft;:t : t 2 R(q)g, the last two sets are identical. So Aj\R(q) = Bj\R(q).
Hence, using III and the denition of Bj, q 2 F (A1; :::; An), as desired. 
6 Dictatorship and strong dictatorship
In fact, the semi-dictator of Theorem 2 is in many cases (including the preference
aggregation problem) a dictator, and in some cases even a strong dictator in the
sense of the following denition that generalises the classical notion of strong
dictatorship in social choice theory.
Denition 7 An individual i is a strong dictator if F (A1; :::; An) = Ai for all
(A1; :::; An) 2 J n.
So a strong dictator imposes his judgments on all rather than just privi-
leged propositions. I will give simple criteria for obtaining (weak or strong)
dictatorship, in terms of the following irreversibility property.
Denition 8 For p; q 2 X, p irreversibly constrained entails q if p `Y q for a
set Y for which fqg [ Y 6` p.
So a constrained entailment p ` q is irreversible if the constrained en-
tailment is not a "constrained equivalence", i.e. if p and q do not condition-
ally entail each other (for at least one choice of Y ). If X is the preference
agenda, all constrained entailments between (distinct) propositions are irre-
versible. For instance, xRy ` xRz is irreversible (for distinct options x; y; z),
since xRy `fyPzg xRz, where fxRz; yPzg 6` xRy.
By the next result, the semi-dictatorship of Theorem 2 becomes a dictator-
ship if we only slightly strengthen the pathlinkedness condition: in at least one
path, at least one constrained entailment should be irreversible.
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Denition 9 (a) For propositions p; q 2 X, I write p ``irrev q if X contains
propositions p1; :::; pm (m  2) with p = p1 ` p2 ` ::: ` pm = q, where
at least one of these constrained entailments is irreversible.
(b) A pathlinked set Z  X is irreversibly pathlinked (in X) if p ``irrev q for
some (hence all) p; q 2 Z.
Theorem 3 If the set fp;:p : p 2 Pg of privileged or negated privileged propo-
sitions is truly and irreversibly pathlinked, some individual is a dictator.
As an application, I obtain the full Arrow theorem by proving that, if X is
the preference agenda, fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly and irreversibly pathlinked.30
Corollary 1 (Arrows Theorem) For the preference agenda (with R and P as
dened above), some individual is a dictator.
Proof. Let X be the preference agenda. I show that (i) P is pathlinked,
and (ii) there are r; s 2 P with true and irreversible constrained entailments
r ` :s ` r. Then, by (i) and Lemma 4, f:p : p 2 Pg is (like P) pathlinked,
which together with (ii) implies that fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly and irreversibly
pathlinked, as desired.
(ii): For any pairwise distinct options x; y; z 2 Q, we have xPy `fyPzg xRz
(= :zRx), and xRz `fzPyg xPy, in each case truly and irreversibly.
(i): Consider any xPy; x0Py0 2 P. I show that xPy `` x0Py0. The paths
to be constructed depend on whether x 2 fx0; y0g and whether y 2 fx0; y0g.
As x 6= y and x0 6= y0, the following list of cases is exhaustive. Case x 6=
x0; y0&y 6= x0; y0: xPy `fx0Px;yPy0g x0Py0. Case y = y0&x 6= x0; y0: xPy `fx0Pxg
x0Py = x0Py0. Case y = x0&x 6= x0; y0: xPy `fyPy0g xPy0 `fx0Pxg x0Py0. Case
x = x0&y 6= y0; x0: xPy `fyPy0g xPy0. Case x = y0&y 6= x0; y0: xPy `fx0Pxg
x0Py `fyPxg x0Px. Case x = x0&y = y0: xPy `; xPy. Case x = y0&y = x0:
taking any z 2 Qnfx; yg, xPy `fyPzg xPz `fyPxg yPz `fzPxg yPx. 
The proof of Theorem 3 uses two further lemmas. For any set S of coalitions
C  N , I dene S := fC  N : C  C for some C 2 Sg.
Lemma 5 For all p; q 2 X,
(a) p ` q irreversibly if and only if :q ` :p irreversibly;
(b) if p ` q irreversibly then C(p)  C(q).
Proof. Let p; q 2 X. Part (a) follows from Lemma 4 and the fact that, for
all Y  P, fqg [ Y 6` p if and only if f:pg [ Y 6` :q.
Regarding (b), suppose p ` q irreversibly, say p `Y q with fqg[ Y 6` p. We
can assume w.l.o.g. that Y \R(p) = Y \R(:q) = ;, since otherwise we could
30This property of fp;:p : p 2 Pg strengthens Nehrings (2003) nding that the preference
agenda is totally blocked, which gave him already a weaker version of Arrows theorem. Part
(i) of our proof is analogous to Nehrings proof and also to proofs for the strict preference
agenda by Dietrich and List (forthcoming) and Dokow and Holzman (2005).
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replace Y by Y  := Y n(R(p) [R(:q)), for which still p `Y  q (by the proof of
Lemma 2) and fqg [ Y  6` p. To show C(p)  C(q), consider any C 2 C(p). So
there is a C 2 C(p) with C  C. Hence there are Ai 2 J , i 2 C, containing
p, such that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, containing :p. Like in
earlier proofs, I may suppose w.l.o.g. that, for all i 2 C, Y  Ai (using that Y
is consistent with all A 2 Rp, R is a relevance relation, III, and Y \R(p) = ;);
hence, by fpg[Y ` q, q 2 Ai for all i 2 C. Further, as f:p; qg[Y is consistent
(by fqg [ Y 6` p), there are sets Ai 2 J , i 2 CnC, such that f:p; qg [ Y  Ai
for all i 2 CnC.
I have to show that q 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, containing
:q. Consider such sets Ai, i 2 NnC. Again, we may assume w.l.o.g. that for
all i 2 NnC, Y  Ai (as Y is consistent with all A 2 R:q, R is a relevance
relation, III, and Y \R(:q) = ;), which by f:qg[Y ` :p implies that :p 2 Ai
for all i 2 NnC. In summary then,
Ai 
8<:
fp; qg [ Y for all i 2 C
f:p; qg [ Y for all i 2 CnC
f:p;:qg [ Y for all i 2 NnC.
So p 2 F (A1; :::; An) (by the choice of the sets Ai, i 2 C) and Y  F (A1; :::; An)
(by Y  P). Hence, as fpg [ Y ` q, q 2 F (A1; :::; An), as desired. 
In the following characterisation of decisive coalitions it is crucial that p 2 P.
Lemma 6 If p 2 P, W(p) = fC  N : all coalitions C  C are in C(p)g.
Proof. Let p 2 P and C  N . If C 2 W(p) then clearly all coalitions
C  C are in C(p). Conversely, suppose all coalitions C  C are in C(p). As
C 2 C(p), there are sets Ai, i 2 C, containing p, such that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for
all sets Ai, i 2 NnC, not containing p. To show that C 2 W(p), consider any
sets Ai, i 2 NnC (containing or not containing p); I show that p 2 F (A1; :::; An).
Let C := C [ fi 2 NnC : p 2 Aig. By C  C, C 2 C(p). So there are sets
Bi, i 2 C, containing p, such that p 2 F (B1; :::; Bn) for all sets Bi, i 2 NnC,
not containing p. By jRpj = 1, Ai \ R(p) = Bi \ R(p) for all i 2 C. So, by
III and the denition of the sets Bi, i 2 C, and since p 62 Ai for all i 2 NnC,
p 2 F (A1; :::; An), as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let fp;:p : p 2 Pg be truly and irreversibly pathlinked.
By Theorem 2, there is a semi-dictator i. I show that i is a dictator.
Claim. For all q 2 fp;:p : p 2 Pg, C(q) contains all coalitions containing i.
Consider any q 2 fq;:q : q 2 Pg and any coalition C  N containing i. By
true pathlinkedness there exist p 2 P and r; s 2 X such that p `` r ` s `` q,
where r ` s is a truly constrained entailment. By fig 2 C(p) and Lemma 3,
fig 2 C(r). So, by Lemma 5(b), C 2 C(s). Hence, by Lemma 3, C 2 C(q),
q.e.d.
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By this claim and Lemma 6, fig 2 W(p) for all p 2 P. This implies that
i is a dictator, by an argument similar to the one that completed the proof of
Theorem 2. 
Finally, for what agendas do we even obtain strong dictatorship? Surely
not for the preference agenda, as it is well-known that Arrows conditions only
imply weak dictatorship.31
Trivially, if all propositions are privileged, every dictatorship is strong:
Corollary 2 If P = X, and X is truly and irreversibly pathlinked, some indi-
vidual is a strong dictator.
But the assumption P = X removes nearly all generality: unanimity preser-
vation becomes the standard unrestricted unanimity condition, and the rele-
vance relation becomes (given universal domain and collective rationality) es-
sentially equivalent to that given, for all p 2 X, byR(p) = fpg (since jRpj = 1).
However, strong dictatorship follows under a much less restrictive condition than
P = X. Call p 2 X logically equivalent to A  X if A entails p and p entails all
q 2 A (i.e., intuitively, if p is equivalent to the conjunction of all q 2 A). For
instance, a ^ b is equivalent to fa; bg (where a; b; a ^ b 2 X).
Theorem 4 If fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly and irreversibly pathlinked and each
proposition in X is logically equivalent to a set of negated privileged propositions
A  f:p : p 2 Pg, some individual is a strong dictator.
Proof. Let the assumptions hold. By Theorem 3, there is a dictator i. To
show that i is a strong dictator, I consider any (A1; :::; An) 2 J n, and I show
that Ai = F (A1; :::; An). Obviously, it su¢ ces to show that F (A1; :::; An)  Ai.
Suppose q 2 F (A1; :::; An). By assumption, q is logically equivalent to some
A  f:p : p 2 Pg. For all :p 2 A, we have :p 2 F (A1; :::; An) (by q ` :p),
hence p 62 F (A1; :::; An), and so p 62 Ai (as p 2 P and i is a dictator), implying
that :p 2 Ai. This shows that A  Ai. So q 2 Ai (since A ` q), as desired. 
The preference agenda X, which has not strongly dictatorial solutions, in-
deed violates the extra condition in Theorem 4: some propositions inX (namely
precisely the privileged propositions xPy) are not logically equivalent to any set
of negated privileged propositions xRy.
Example 2 (continued) As argued earlier, fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly pathlinked in
many instances of this aggregation problem. The other conditions in Theorem
4 also often hold, so that strong dictatorship follows. The reasons are simple.
First, X is often rich in irreversible constrained entailments. For instance,
if X contains value assignments V = 3 and W = 3 and the constraint W > V ,
then V = 3 ` :(W = 3) irreversibly, since V = 3 `fW>V g :(W = 3) but
31Lexicographic dictatorships satisfy all conditions but are only weak dictatorships.
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f:(W = 3);W > V g 6` V = 3; or, if X contains a constraint c that is strictly
stronger than another constraint c0 2 C, then c ` c irreversibly, since c `; c0
but fc0g [ ; = fc0g 6` c.
Second, if P is again given by (9), each proposition q 2 X is indeed logically
equivalent to a set of negated privileged propositions A  f:p : p 2 Pg: if q
has the form V = v, one should take A = f:(V = v0) : v0 2 ran(V )nfvgg;
otherwise q has the form :p with p 2 P, and so one may take A = fqg.
7 Conclusion
The above impossibility ndings might be interpreted as showing how rele-
vance R should not be specied. Indeed, in order to enable non-degenerate
aggregation rules, R must display su¢ ciently many inter-relevances. But such
a richness in inter-relevances may imply that collective decisions have to be
made in a "wholistic" manner: many semantically unrelated decisions must be
bundled and decided simultaneously. Two propositions, say one on tra¢ c reg-
ulations and one on diplomatic relations with Argentina, have to be treated
simultaneously if the relevance relation (specied su¢ ciently richly to enable
non-degenerate aggregation rules) displays some possibly indirect link between
the two.32 Large and semantically disparate decision problems are a hard chal-
lenge in practice.
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